Uno de los temas de estudio de la filosofía de las matemáticas tiene que ver con cómo accedemos al conocimiento de los objetos de las matemáticas, al ser objetos abstractos. En este artículo mostraremos que esta forma de "acceso" es la intuición, entendida como un proceso dinámico que requiere de la experiencia de los matemáticos, cuyos efectos se verán en el mundo concreto. Partiendo del dilema expuesto por Benacerraf, revisaremos cómo la intuición es una posible solución y ha tenido un (...) papel protagónico en la epistemología de las matemáticas. Finalmente, revisaremos el papel de las ideas de Kitcher frente a la teoría del conocimiento matemático y el papel de la intuición. (shrink)

I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a version of the Sorites, and argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the Cut-off Point Problem” and contend that this problem, well known by Sorites scholars, ought to play a key role in the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle. Very briefly, I show that, in the Lottery Paradox, the premises “ticket n°1 will lose”, “ticket n°2 will lose”… “ticket (...) n°1000 will lose” are equivalent to soritical premises of the form “~(the winning ticket is in {…, (tn)}) ⊃ ~(the winning ticket is in {…, tn, (tn + 1)})” (where “⊃” is the material conditional, “~” is the negation symbol, “tn” and “tn + 1” are “ticket n°n” and “ticket n°n + 1” respectively, and “{}” identify the elements of the lottery tickets’ set. The brackets in “(tn)” and “(tn + 1)” are meant to point out that in the antecedent of the conditional we do not always have a “tn” (and, as a result, a “tn + 1” in the consequent): consider the conditional “~(the winning ticket is in {}) ⊃ ~(the winning ticket is in {t1})”). As a result, failing to believe, for some ticket, that it will lose comes down to introducing a cut-off point in a chain of soritical premises. In this paper I explore the consequences of the different ways of blocking the Lottery Paradox with respect to the Cut-off Point Problem. A heap variant of the Lottery Paradox is especially relevant for evaluating the different solutions. One important result is that the most popular way out of the puzzle, i.e., denying the Lockean Thesis, becomes less attractive. Moreover, I show that, along with the debate on whether rational belief is closed under classical logic, the debate on the validity of modus ponens should play an important role in discussions on the Lottery Paradox. -/- . (shrink)

This paper generalizes the preface paradox beyond the conjunctive aggregation of beliefs and constructs an analogous paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case suggests a systematic restriction of intuitive rules for reasoning with obligations. This proposal can be transferred to the epistemic case: it avoids the preface and the lottery paradox and saves one of the two directions of the Lockean Thesis (i.e., high credence is sufficient, but not necessary for rational belief). The resulting account compares favorably (...) to competing proposals; in particular, we can formulate the rules of correct doxastic reasoning without reference to probabilistic features of the involved propositions. (shrink)

La intuición y su relación con la invención matemática es destacada por los autores franceses Henri Bergson y Henri Poincaré. Los dos asumen la intuición como un proceso intelectual, que requiere de la experiencia tanto física como matemática del individuo y cuyos resultados se observarán en la superficie de la conciencia, es decir, en el lenguaje matemático. Ambos asumen que la idea de intuición es necesaria para la invención matemática. En este artículo se muestran los puntos coincidentes entre Bergson y (...) Poincaré en torno a la relación intuición-invención, mostrando cómo su definición lleva a interpretar la intuición como un proceso y, finalmente, cómo la idea de esquema dinámico introducida por Bergson para explicar la invención está implícita en el pensamiento de Poincaré. (shrink)

La historia de la matemática muestra como la intuición matemática ha estado presente en la invención y desarrollo de conceptos, teorías y procedimientos matemáticos. Así mismo, ha permeado el debate filosófico, los fundamentos de la matemática y los discursos educativos; otorgándole vigencia al estudio de este tema. En el presente artículo, se exponen los argumentos bajo los cuales es posible sustentar que la intuición es un proceso, que toma ideas que se presentan, inicialmente de manera “desordenada”, y que gracias al (...) contexto y los conocimientos previos del individuo las centran en una idea “fija” que será incorporada a la matemática por la lógica y la formalización. (shrink)

Review of Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments by Kevin McCain (Routledge, 2021).

In the field of the philosophy of mathematics, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of two processes: intuition and visualization. History has shown us that great mathematicians in their inventions have used these processes to arrive at their most brilliant proofs, theories and concepts. In this article, we want to defend that both intuition and visualization can be understood as processes that contribute to the development of mathematical knowledge as evidenced in the history of mathematics. Like intuition, visualization (...) does not have a definition, and its role has become more prominent both in pure mathematics and in educational research. For us, both visualization and intuition are processes that start from the real world of those who “intuit” or “visualize,” require experience and knowledge of concepts and theories (the more expertise in the subject, the more profound the results will be) and must, in the end, be validated by the specialized academic community. In this article, we defend the importance of visualization in mathematical practice and its role in the advances of great scientists (Euclid, Euler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Maxwell, Riemann, Einstein, Feynman, among others) as an alternative and valuable way to symbolic thinking, which has “reigned” in the academic and scientific community. (shrink)

El siguiente documento es el resultado de un seminario de investigación sobre novela policíaca latinoamericana reciente, desarrollado en el curso de Novela Latinoamericana, de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras en la Universidad de La Salle. La fundamentación teórica del seminario tuvo como marco general la Estética de la Recepción fundada en la Escuela de Constanza, Alemania, por Hans Robert Jauss y Wolfgang Iser. Para el caso concreto de la teoría literaria sobre novela policíaca vista en perspectiva sociológica, preferimos apelar (...) a las reflexiones fundacionales de Roger Caillios (1942), las que tiene un sugestivo subtítulo, a saber, La novela policíaca. –De cómo la inteligencia se retira del mundo para consagrarse a sus juegos y de cómo la sociedad introduce sus problemas en éstos. Por otra parte, elegimos la novela corta de Roberto Bolaño, La pista de hielo; y sobre esta elaboramos distintas hipótesis de trabajo, hasta lograr, al juicio de nuestros lectores, una propuesta de teoría literaria, que dé cuenta de la nueva narrativa policíaca. (shrink)

This article reflects on the concepts of health, well‐being, gender, and dignity when providing nursing care to older adults, focusing on their wisdom and the phenomena that can affect their health or improve their quality of life. These concepts are analyzed based on the current health conditions of older adults and their needs, on the perspectives of authors in this field of research, and on Patricia Benner's philosophy: the integration of science, clinical wisdom, and ethics in nursing practice. Furthermore, this (...) article aims at contributing to the health, well‐being, gender, and dignity of older adults, despite the discrimination that they may face, as well as to the reality of nursing practice. As such, this study stems from the observed reality, experiences as caregivers and reflection of nurses committed to the values of the profession. Therefore, the article begins with the conceptualization of health, well‐being, gender, and dignity, subsequently analyzing the health–disease status of older adults from a gender perspective, addressing nursing care for older adults based on Patricia Benner's philosophy and concluding with reflections on nursing practice for a better future for older adults. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo responde algunas críticas planteadas por Ignacio Ávila a mi interpretación de la epistemología davidsoniana. Presento argumentos en contra de: a) que sea necesario distinguir entre representaciones epistemológicamente “peligrosas”e “inofensivas”; b) que el empirismo mínimo sea un tipo de realismo directo; c) que mi uso de la expresión “evidencia distal” y el interés por la teoría de la correspondencia sean asuntos ajenos a Davidson. Finalmente, sostengo que la triangulación es un elemento fundamental de la epistemología davidsoniana, pues permite (...) sortear la ansiedad realista manteniéndose en una postura no representacionalista. ABSTRACT In this article, I respond to some of Ignacio Ávila's criticisms of my interpretation of Davidson’s epistemology. I argue against: a) the need to distinguish between epistemologically “dangerous” and “harmless” representations; b) the idea that minimal empiricism is a kind of direct realism; and c) the claim that my usage of the expression “distal evidence” and interest in the theory of correspondence are issues that do not pertain to Davidson. Finally, I claim that triangulation is a key element in Davidsonian epistemology since it allows us to deal with the realist anxiety while maintaining a non-representationalist viewpoint. (shrink)

O objetivo geral deste artigo se concentra em abordar, a partir de uma abordagem holística, as implicações éticas relacionadas ao uso da Inteligência Artificial, doravante IA, na geração de conteúdos acadêmicos. Três elementos-chave são abordados neste artigo: um estado da arte sobre as IA de maior demanda no âmbito acadêmico atual; as implicações éticas vinculadas ao plágio, à originalidade e à fraude; e, por fim, a caracterização das ferramentas de monitoramento de conteúdos acadêmicos gerados por IA. A pesquisa se enquadra (...) dentro de uma abordagem qualitativa, cuja fonte de coleta de informações é documental e, quanto ao nível ou grau de conhecimento gerado, trata-se de uma pesquisa descritiva. A principal conclusão a que esta pesquisa chega consiste em alertar para os benefícios das ferramentas de inteligência artificial na otimização de tarefas acadêmicas e de pesquisa, mas também advertir sobre as implicações éticas desfavoráveis que o uso dessas ferramentas pode acarretar quando não utilizadas de forma responsável, especialmente no campo da pesquisa acadêmica. Existem muitas ferramentas de inteligência artificial que podem auxiliar o pesquisador na realização de tarefas como coleta, sistematização e análise de dados e informações, revisão da escrita, citações e referências, entre outras; porém, também há o risco de perda de originalidade na pesquisa. (shrink)

Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.

Community leaders in Colombia have historically suffered processes of microaggressions and intimidation that threaten the free exercise of their voice in the processes of production of knowledge and in the participation of the planning of their territories. In this article, we explore the case study of the Network of Community Researchers (NCR), also known in Spanish as Red de Investigadores Comunitarios, promoted by the University of Antioquia, Colombia. The NCR is a commitment to the co-production of knowledge about human security (...) from below between community researchers and academics. This article analyses the contribution of the NCR to the human security of Medellin and a specific collection of capabilities for epistemic liberation of community researchers: the capability to be recognised as a producer of valid knowledge, to do through communicative openness, to learn from collective knowledge and to transform through collective action. The expansion of these four capabilities evidence processes of resistance and hermeneutic insurrection of some community leaders and activists who participate in the NCR. The analysis shows the contribution of the NCR to facilitate and generate a safe space in which community researchers communicate knowledge and practices and share experiences, risks, struggles, fears and collective dreams of transformation. (shrink)

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...) mental states or mental facts, and also against a variant of Factualism that says that some practical reasons are facts and others are false beliefs. I argue that the conception of practical reasons defended here provides plausible answers to the second and third questions above; and gives a more unified and satisfactory picture of practical reasons than those offered by its rivals. (shrink)

This article presents an archaeological analysis of some of the discourses and practices that played a decisive role in the effectuation of the Conquest of America and the establishment of a political order based on a racial prejudice and domination. A political order that was, in consequence, extremely exclusionary and violent. This research is based on the concepts of biopolitics and anthropological machine created by Giorgio Agamben, as well as on the relationship that exists between them and the communities founded (...) on identitarian principles; the researches of post-colonial philosophers; and Carl Schmit’s writings on International Law. The analysis of the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of the human being, the geographical division of the World created from Europe, and the political treaties concluded between the emerging European States during fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, allows me to propose the Conquest of America as a paradigmatic case of this form of power that has characterized Western politics: biopolitics. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

En este texto, la profesora María Teresa Uribe de Hincapié ofrece dos campos de análisis que resultan muy novedosos para el estudio de la historia política del país. El primero hace referencia al lugar central ocupado por el lenguaje del republicanismo cívico durante el proceso de emancipación y a lo largo del siglo xix; y el segundo está relacionado con la identificación de la retórica patriótica que sirvió de anclaje para que los referentes de identidad fueran cercanos y familiares, (...) en el terreno emocional, y viables, en el político. La tesis que orienta el texto señala que, ante la inexistencia de identidades culturales preexistentes y la imperiosa necesidad de crear una identidad política que rompiera con un pasado asociado al régimen de la Colonia, la intelectualidad neogranadina encontró en los relatos de los agravios, la exclusión, la usurpación y la sangre derramada la posibilidad de construir una historia con sentido, un pasado glorioso y una imagen auténtica de la nación. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

Prolonging working hours and presenteeism have been conceptualized as self-endangering coping behaviors in employees, which are related to health impairment. Drawing upon the self-regulation of behavior model, the goal achievement process, and Warr's vitamin model, we examined the antecedents and moderation effects regarding quantitative demands, autonomy, emotion regulation, and self-motivation competence of university students' self-endangering coping behaviors. Results from a cross-sectional survey of 3,546 German university students indicate that quantitative demands are positively related and autonomy has a u-shape connection with (...) self-endangering coping. Emotion regulation was shown to be a protective factor for prolonging working hours. Moreover, self-motivation moderated the relationship between quantitative demands and prolonging of working hours, but not in the assumed direction. Self-motivation showed a systematic positive relationship with prolonging of working hours, but no relationship with presenteeism. Autonomy moderated the relationship of quantitative demands with both self-endangering behaviors. We found no moderating effects for emotion regulation of quantitative demands or autonomy and self-endangering behaviors. Besides further practical implications, the results suggest that lecturers should design their courses accordingly with less time pressure and university students should be trained in the use of autonomy. (shrink)

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

This paper presents an overview of my work in philosophy from my first book on Friedrich Schiller and the political sublime to my most recent project on listening to traumatic forms of violence. Starting with a reflection on the autobiographical character of philosophy, I propose to take up the question of an aesthetic dimension of philosophical critique, where aesthetics is understood as an always already embodied perspective on the world, on truth, and on philosophical activity, as well as an always (...) already political realm, where the distribution of sense pre-determines our approach and articulation of experience. Departing from aesthetics understood and deployed as critique, the paper moves on to ask about the specific frameworks of sense or grammars that determine in advance the conditions of audibility in the realms of memory-building and history-making—particularly in those contexts where historical, political, and institutional forms of violence produce silencing and erasure. Putting in dialogue the latter with decolonial studies, I (re)interpret “traumatic violence” as a colonizing form of violence, understanding that one of its central aspects is that it is not only an assault on life but on the conditions of production of sense that make life legible as such. In this context, my project on grammars of listening seeks to carefully unpack these complex intersections while also explaining why I believe that a radical form of listening is an essential subversive/imaginative strategy against traumatic/colonial violence. (shrink)

Since the publication of Davidson’s influential article ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’, semantical considerations are widely thought to support the doctrine that actions are events. I shall argue that the semantics of action sentences do not imply that actions are events. This will involve defending a negative claim and a positive claim, as well as a proposal for how to formalize action sentences. The negative claim is that the semantics of action sentences do not require that we think of (...) actions as events, even if these sentences are best formalized in the manner that Davidson himself favours. The positive claim is that the simplest way of formalizing actions sentences which captures all and only licit inferences requires quantification only, over the results of actions. If this is right, then the argument from semantics evaporates, and the claim that actions are events needs to be freshly argued for – or against. (shrink)

As evaluation of practitioners’ competence is largely based on self-report, accuracy in practitioners’ self-assessment is essential for ensuring high quality treatment-delivery. The aim of this study was to assess the relationship between independent observers’ ratings and practitioners’ self-reported treatment integrity ratings of Motivational interviewing. Practitioners were randomized to two types of supervision [i.e., regular institutional group supervision, or individual telephone supervision based on the MI Treatment Integrity code]. The mean age was 43.2 years, and 62.7 percent were females. All sessions (...) were recorded and evaluated with the MITI, and the MI skills were self-assessed with a questionnaire over a period of 12 months. The associations between self-reported and objectively assessed MI skills were overall weak, but increased slightly from baseline to the 12-months assessment. However, the self-ratings from the group that received monthly objective feedback were not more accurate than those participating in regular group supervision. These results expand findings from previous studies and have important implications for assessment of practitioners’ treatment fidelity: Practitioners may learn to improve the accuracy of self-assessment of competence, but to ensure that patients receive intended care, adherence and competence should be assessed objectively. (shrink)

This paper explores the question whether whatever is done intentionally is done for a reason. Apart from helping us to think about those concepts, the question is interesting because it affords an opportunity to identify a number of misconceptions about reasons. In the paper I argue that there are things that are done intentionally but not done for a reason. I examine two different kinds of example: things done “because one wants to” and “purely expressive actions”. Concerning the first, I (...) argue that the tendency to think that things done because one wants to are things done for a reason derives from conflating the reason that explains why someone did something with their reason for doing it. While these sometimes coincide, they need not always do so. And although the fact that someone wanted to do something can contribute to explaining the person's action, it is not normally that person's reason for doing that thing. Purely expressive actions also provide examples of things done intentionally but not for a reason. I argue that, although those actions are spontaneous, they are nonetheless intentional and that, since they are mere expressions of emotions, they are not done for reasons - although there are reasons why we do them. (shrink)

RESUMEN El texto explora, en mujeres mayores de 80 años, la experiencia vivida durante el pe ríodo conocido como La Violencia en Colombia. Se examina el "trauma" que, según la autora, se manifiesta como "rayones", lo que hace difícil traducirlo o interpretarlo, porque solo se percibe a través de la escucha. Se estudia lo que M. Heidegger exploró como "ser-ahí" y "ser-en-el-mundo", esto es, el estar lanzados al mundo en un de terminado contexto donde construimos nuestra subjetividad y aprendemos a (...) vivir, para entenderlo mediante estas experiencias femeninas singulares. ABSTRACT The text explores the experience lived during the period known as The Violence in Colombia by women now over 80. It examines the "trauma" that, according to the author, manifests itself in the form of "scratches", thus making it difficult to translate and interpret given that it is only perceptible through listening. The article discusses M. Heidegger's notions of Dasein and being-in-the-world, that is, our thrownness into the world in a specific context in which we construct our subjectivity and learn how to live, in order to understand them through these singular feminine experiences. (shrink)

RESUMEN El trabajo tiene como objetivo revelar la contribución social de médicos camagüeyanos negros a la educación católica, a partir de su relación con los colegios regentados por la Iglesia, en un contexto marcado por desigualdades raciales. Se utilizaron métodos teóricos como la revisión documental y bibliográfica, también fueron aplicadas historias de vida y entrevistas. La investigación se centra en el quehacer asistencial de médicos camagüeyanos, vinculados a las Hermanas Oblatas de la Providencia, en particular a los colegios a cargo (...) de estas monjas negras, que educaban a niñas y niños de ese color de piel. Se pudo esclarecer quiénes fueron los doctores más vinculados a esas instituciones y establecer cuál fue su labor en ellas en las décadas del 40- 50 del siglo XX. Queda valorada su contribución social en la asistencia brindada a ese segmento poblacional y al significado de esta sin la mediación de prejuicios raciales. ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is reveal the social contribution of black Camagüey doctors to the Catholic education from it relation with the schools occupied by the church in a context marked by racials ineguality. It put in practical use theoric methods such as documentary an bibliographical revisión; it also were aplyed life history and entreviews. The research it focus in the assistance job of the Camaguey doctor linked to the Sisters Providence Oblates, especially the schools of these black nuns who give education to black girls and boys. The paper show who were the doctors most linked to these religious institution and to situate their Jobs in these schools in the ´40 and ´50 of the 20 th century. Their social contribution is valved in this type of population and the meaning of this contribution with out racial prejudice. (shrink)

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...) action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively.1. (shrink)

Voy a comenzar citando a Reyes Mate quien considera que todo pensamiento mira desde algún lugar, está situado. No hay pensamiento sin experiencia ni sin su ubicación. Esta aseveración es imperativa para la antropología contemporánea tan preocupada por hacer explícito el lugar desde el cual se habla o se escribe. En mi condición de antropóloga dedicada al estudio de la violencia y la memoria quiero hacer explícito el lugar desde el cual voy a hablar y a quienes pretendo interpelar. El (...) horizonte a partir del cual hago las siguientes consideraciones es el de la barbarie que ha caracterizado la guerra en Colombia. Entiendo por barbarie algunas prácticas atroces como la desaparición forzada, la tortura, el asesinato individual y colectivo y el desmembramiento, prácticas que vengo estudiando desde hace cerca de treinta años. Aunque mis reflexiones actuales tienen como punto de referencia a las víctimas del conflicto armado, no quiero hablar conceptualmente de ellas como tampoco pretendo hablar por ellas. Quisiera, mas bien, examinar el contexto en el cual familiares y sobrevivientes luchan por preservar las memorias de unos hechos violentos que partieron en dos sus vidas. [Fragmento]. (shrink)